Stephan has asked several important and relevant questions regarding our argument for religious non-neutrality, and the following is a start at answering those questions. We have argued at least three things his questions concern. First, in episode 24, we presented an argument that something must be self-existent. Second, not elaborated in episode 24, but in episode 19, we argued, among other things, that theories and concepts by necessity ultimately presuppose something as self-existent. And third, also in episode 19, we argued that taking something as self-existent is a religious belief. What we say in episode 19 goes some way in answering some of Stephan's questions. But here we will try to answer his specific questions directly.
These are the questions we answer:
1. What do these arguments (seek to) explain?
2. What do the terms ‘self-exist’ and ‘depend,’ as we use them, mean?
3. Why is belief in something as self-existent the right definition of religious belief? Isn't religious belief, rather, about belief apart from reason and evidence?
4. If everyone is religious, even if without knowing it, why not say everyone is a Christian, even if without knowing it?
It's important to clarify that none of our arguments mentioned above are intended as arguments for the existence of any god, let alone the Christian God, or for the truth of Christianity. The Thomistic (5 ways) arguments, the moral argument, and the ontological argument, are arguments for God's existence. However, the 11-lecture series on Philosophy Of Religion (linked in the shownotes of episode 24), at a semi-popular level, elaborates on why we don’t take such arguments to be good arguments, and in fact why the project of seeking to “prove” God's existence is fundamentally misconceived.
It's also important to clarify that we recognize libertarianism can be held upon various differing grounds. We also recognize that affirming what libertarianism is, is enough to be libertarian regardless of one's grounds. To put it in other terms, we agree that libertarianism, as such, is “thin.” What we deny is that anyone holds to it “thinly,” that is without, at least implicit, grounds.
If one were to say, “look, I don't know why, but self-ownership, property right, and the non-aggression principle just seem right to me,” then we don't dispute that one is holding to libertarianism. However, further questions can be asked. Despite not being aware why it seems right to you, it could be asked what “seems right to you” means. Maybe it means it seems to fit with, or at least to not obviously conflict with, other things about the world that also simply seem right to you. And there you have grounds (if implicit) for your libertarianism in however “the world” seems to you to be. It's not that one must justify one's libertarianism in order to believe it. Rather, if one did seek to justify it, then such a justification would be grounded in some view or other of how things more broadly seem to you to be.
We can see this at work in the way some people, after initially claiming to believe it, have talked themselves out of libertarianism exactly by asking themselves such further questions. After identifying something about “how things more broadly” seem to them to be that conflicts with libertarianism, they abandon their belief in libertarianism. After further reflection, their grounds for affirming libertarianism appeared weak, and rather than changing their view of the world, they changed their minds about libertarianism. I don't suppose Stephan necessarily disagrees that this is how our minds and beliefs tend to operate. But I offer the explanation to clarify that we are not trying to argue that one must pronounce on this or that view of the basic nature of reality in general, or on what one takes to be self-existent, in order to affirm libertarianism. And yet, we do argue that such grounds are necessarily implied by anyone's affirmation of it.
1. With that distinction clarified, we're in a better position to see the answer to the first (as I number it above) question. What do these arguments seek to explain? What are we trying to explain by arguing that a.) something must be self-existent, b.) theories and concepts ultimately presuppose something as self-existent, and c.) taking something as self-existent is a religious belief?
The answer is this: we're seeking to explain the (perhaps surprisingly) religious character of the ultimate grounds inevitably implied by one's belief in libertarianism. One may respond by saying, first, this seems counter-intuitive to me, and second, no one need pronounce on what grounds, nor needs to justify, one's libertarianism to believe it. Our reply to this is yes, if you don't consider yourself or any of your beliefs to be at all religious, you will likely find this surprising or counter-intuitive, and yes, we agree that no one need pronounce on (or even be conscious of) grounds for, and no one need justify, one's libertarianism to believe it.
2. In episode 24, we argued this way that something must be self-existent:
“ Self-existence means being in a way that doesn't depend on anything else. Anything that exists either depends on something else for its existence, or it doesn't (in which case it is self-existent). Considering all that exists, either some part of it exists in ultimate dependence upon some other part that is self-existent, or no part depends on any other part, in which case the whole, necessarily, would be self-existent since there's nothing else for it to depend on. So, either some part of all that exists is self-existent, or the whole is self-existent. Any view of reality necessarily entails one option or the other. If anything exists, then something has to be self-existent. ”
In order to understand what is being argued here, the sense of ‘depend’ has to be understood. The general sense of ‘depend’ here is “require as an ultimate (pre)condition” for something's existence. So, ‘y’ depends on ‘x’ in this sense where ‘x’ is a necessary, ultimate condition for ‘y’ to exist. While a more particular sense of ‘depend’ can be relative to a more particular view of the two kinds of things in relation, this is the general, meaningful sense of ‘depend’ that obtains in every case.
This may still seem too abstract to grasp a firm idea of it. And further, there is at least one type of view of what exists that tends to obscure this meaning of ‘depend,’ given that in such a view actual dependency is excluded, since only one thing exists. The following examples and further descriptions may clarify.
Suppose you held to a particular sort of physicalism or materialism. You believe that all that exists is purely and exclusively matter-energy. To exist is to be material; to be material is to exist. There isn't anything non-material that can exist. In this view, matter-energy is not a “part” of all that exists. Rather, matter-energy simply is all that exists (although matter-energy may be variously configured). In such a case, nothing other than matter-energy is taken to be a necessary ultimate condition, because there simply is nothing else. Matter-energy is unconditionally non-dependent, which is to say self-existent. It exists in a way that doesn't depend on anything else for its existence. So, to exist and to self-exist are identical. This view excludes anything actually depending on anything for its existence, since only material exists.
Such a view may be understood in terms of one or another sort of so-called strong reductionism. One sort of strong reductionism might be called “meaning replacement.” The nature of reality is exclusively that of ‘x’ (in this case, material) so all things have only properties of ‘x’ and are governed only by laws of ‘x.’ All terms supposed to have non-x meaning can be replaced by x-terms without loss of meaning, while not all x-terms can be replaced by terms supposed to have non-x meaning. Another sort of strong reductionism might be called “factual identity.” While, here too, the nature of reality is exclusively that of ‘x’ so all things have only properties of ‘x’ and are governed only by laws of ‘x,’ in this case, although the meaning of all non-x terms cannot be reduced to that of x-terms, their reference is, nevertheless, to exclusively x-things.
Now suppose you held to a different sort of physicalism or materialism. You believe that ultimately all that exists, and so the nature of reality, is most basically matter-energy. Some things that are not purely and exclusively material exist, but whatever non-material properties there are (or whatever non-material laws might govern them), it is only something's materiality that makes possible any other kinds of properties (or laws).
Such a view may be understood in terms of one or another sort of so-called weak reductionism. One sort of weak reductionism might be called “epiphenomenalism.” Non-x (in this case, non-material) properties exist, but all things are governed only by laws of ‘x.’ All genuine explanations must be given exclusively in x-terms. Another sort of weak reductionism might be called “causal dependency.” Here, there are non-x properties and non-x laws, however there is a one-way causality. Whatever non-x properties and laws exist could not exist without ‘x,’ while ‘x’ can exist without anything non-x. In either view, ‘x’ is unconditionally non-dependent, which is to say it is self-existent, because it exists in a way that doesn't depend on anything else for its existence.
Unlike the cases of strong reductionism, with weak reductionism there are some things with non-x properties (or also laws) that exist and depend on ‘x’ for existence. And even though with strong reductionism, there is only what is self-existent, and nothing else to depend on it, the general sense of ‘depend’ as “require as an ultimate condition” for existence is still meaningful (if only instantiated negatively, in terms of non-dependence). So, the particular examples and further descriptions given should also help clarify what it means to self-exist, namely to be unconditionally non-dependent, or to exist in a way that doesn't depend on anything else for its existence. To “not depend” means to not require (anything) as an ultimate condition. So to be self-existent is to exist in a way that doesn't require anything else as an ultimate condition for its existence.
3. But, why is belief in something as self-existent the right definition of religious belief? Isn't religious belief, rather, about belief apart from reason and evidence? The primary reason that belief in something as self-existent is the right definition of religious belief is that it is the only feature or element that all (what are commonly called) “religions” have in common. A view of faith as belief apart from reason and evidence is not a common feature of all religions; Reformed Christianity being one example of a religion with a different view of faith (namely, a view of faith as not apart from reason and evidence).
In episode 19 we addressed the possible objection that in order for belief in something as self-existent to be a properly religious belief, it must involve worship or ethics. But, that simply doesn't hold up under examination of various religions, as we explained. Still another possible objection is that granting belief in something as self-existent is the only feature all religions have in common, it doesn't necessarily follow that belief in something as self-existent is always a religious belief, because (even if unconsciously) taking something as self-existent is also (at least implicitly) implied by any and every theory or concept.
Our concisely stated answer to that objection is this: as an equivalent and competing belief in something as self-existent to the belief in, for example, the Christian God, no belief in something as self-existent ceases to be an equally religious belief simply because it occurs in the context of a theory or concept. Whatever anyone takes to be self-existent (although what that may be can vary widely) plays the same role as grounds for the system or complex of one's beliefs as it does in religions, and is held on the same basis, namely, self-evidence.
In any case, it's certainly understandable why, for example, physicalists or materialists would prefer not to use the term “religious” in application to their own beliefs about the unconditionally non-dependent (self-existent) status of matter-energy. Since they associate (tho without warrant) all religious belief with irrationality, or as being apart from reason and evidence, then avoiding the term “religious” for their belief in something as self-existent is an attempt to make their beliefs look uniquely rational.
4. If everyone is religious, even if without knowing it, why not say everyone is a Christian, even if without knowing it? The answer is this: everyone who holds to any theory or concept (for example, the political philosophy of libertarianism) meets the criterion of having a religious belief, viz, that the given theory or concept, at least implicitly, implies some grounds in a view of the nature of reality and of something as self-existent. However, not everyone meets the criterion of being a Christian, viz, trusting in the person and work of Christ alone on their behalf for full and free salvation from the just penalty they deserve of God's everlasting condemnation as guilty sinners.
In these replies, we hope we have offered clear and persuasive (if only initial) answers to Stephan Kinsella's questions. Of course, more questions can be asked. (Or perhaps we unintentionally missed a question). It may be, however, that further clarification requires consulting the more elaborate argument presented in Roy Clouser's The Myth Of Religious Neutrality. Nevertheless, our replies here might be helpful in elaborating what we say in episode 24. Thanks, again, to Stephan, for all his work on libertarianism, and for graciously taking the time to interact on these issues.
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